关键词:资本预算;道德风险;有限责任租金;配置效率

Research on corporate capital budgeting based on the moral hazard and the lim ited liability constraints

KANG Jin-jun, OUYANG Ling-nan

Abstract:In realistic capitalbudgeting, headquarters should notnaively apply theNPV rule because of infor-mation asymmetry. The theory of incentives shows thatheadquarters has to trade off the incentive cost inclu-ding the ex ante limited liability rents and the expected revenue produced by induced effortdue to themoral hazard and limited liability ofdivisionmanagers in capitalbudgetingwithin decentralized firms. When the rev-enue is between the optimal incentive cost and second optimal incentive cost induced by the limited liability constraints, the existence of limited liability rentswill decrease the level of effor,t and reduce the expected revenue, hence, weakening the capital allocative efficiency.

Key words:capitalbudgeting; moralhazard; limited liability rents; allocative efficiency